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Constructivism or scientific realism? Which is the better framework for educational
research?
Peter G. Cole Edith Cowan University
ABSTRACT
The doctrines of constructivism and
scientific realism have had a profound
impact on recent progress in educational
research. These doctrines are often
depicted as conflicting doctrines in
theoretical papers and methodology texts
dealing with educational research issues.
This paper explores the differences
between the major tenets of constructivism
and scientific reason. Different values
ascribed to the scientific method in the
context of these two doctrines are also
examined. The paper focuses on three
problems that have dogged the education
research agenda: the conflict between the
constructivist and scientific realistic
viewpoints on science, the validity of
observation statements and the role of
relativism in science. An argument is made
that discovery science is typically
dependent on scientific realism, but that
constructivism offers a counterpoint to the
excessive scientism inherent in some kinds
of empirical research. The most important
differences, however, are probably found
in their respective orientations to ~arch
activity
and
problem-solving.
The
constructivist favours idiographic research
and contextual analysis and the scientific
realist is committed to nomothetic methods
and empirical generalisation.
The doctrines of constructivism and
scientific realism have had a profound
impact on the progress of educational
research. The influence of these two
doctrines has been demonstrated frequently
in theoretical papers and methodology
texts that deal with educational research.
Recent issues of the Educational
Researcher abound with references to the
conflict between constructivism and
scientific realism and the implications for
qualitative and quantitative research
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methods (Eisner, 1992; Erickson, 1992;
Gage, 109; Rizo, 1991; Schrag, 1992).
This paper contains an outline of the major
tenets of constructivism and scientific
realism. In particular, the paper focuses on
three problems that are central to the
conflict between the constructivist and
scientific realistic agendas: the conflict
between the constructivist and scientific
realist viewpoints on scientific activity, the
validity of observation statements and the
degree of relativistic thought in these
doctrines.
Despite their more obvious differences,
most constructivists and scientific realists
agree on two major issues. First, they both
accept the view that the tenets of primitive
empiricism, especially those associated
with the version of the theory known as
logical
positivism,
are
essentially
untenable (Boyd, 1983). Exponents of both
doctrines hold to the position that crude
empirical approaches are a poor basis for
any substantive scientific theory, mainly
because collections of brute facts
invariably
lead
to
superficial
phenomenalism (Scruton, 1994). Realists
and
constructivists
contend
that
undisciplined observations are not
productive of scientific interpretation
(Boyd, 1983). Proponents of both doctrines
doubt that the cumulative accretion of data
from particular categories of events will
result in the acquisition of valuable
theoretical knowledge.
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Second, realists and constructivists agree
that their fundamental differences are
concerned with the nature of scientific
theories and their relationship with the
substance and brute facts of phenomena
(Hacking, 1982). They concur in the view
that science is concerned with the
development of theoretical constructs and
generalisations about the world. Both agree
that valid theories are based on coherent
and well articulated abstractions, though
the status of the logical structure of such
propositions is often disputed by the
respective parties. The main dimensions of
difference between the constructivists and
scientific realists are outlined in Table 1.
The major propositions contained in their
different doctrines are explicated in the
sections that follow.
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST’S VIEW ON
THEORY AND THE NATURE OF
SCIENCE
Constructivists are committed to the view
that the on-going search for theoretical
knowledge in a scientific domain is
governed by rivalry between competing
scientific theories or paradigms. They
claim that historical and contemporary
research reveals the social and competitive
nature of scientific endeavour. They assert
that elaborate conceptual schemes derived
from particular constructions of knowledge
largely determine the nature of the
scientific agenda at any one period of time
(Kuhn, 1970). Constructivists assert that
absolute theoretical truths are elusive.
According to the constructivists true
science is not monumental theory, rather a
set of tentative theoretical abstractions and
analytical constructions.
Proponents of the constructivist doctrine
contend that the typical scientist's views
cannot be described in terms that are
independent of the methodologies used to
test their hypotheses. They maintain that
scientists employ methods, analytical
techniques and procedures that are biased
toward particular conceptual categories
(Feyerabend, 1975). Kuhn (1970) contends
that those who have authored a particular
scientific theory also show preference for
42

particular scientific methods that are said
to offer the best tests of the theory.
Constructivists claim that scientific theory
is so dependent on particular methods that
the processes of theory building should be
viewed as construction devices, not as
discovery procedures (Boyd, 1983).
Constructivists assert that the paradigms
and methodologies adopted by traditional
scientists predispose them to particular
views of reality. They maintain that
theoretical views on the nature of reality
are linked with major paradigms that
depend on circumscribed types of
knowledge. Facts are selected in such a
way as to fit with such preordained views
of the world. This is a radical view of
knowledge acquisition, the assertion being
made is that theoretical science is not
objective. However, the view is not new in
philosophical discourse. It has a long
history in epistemology, derived mainly
from the scepticism inherent in much of
British empiricism. Constructivists claim
that much of what scientific realists call
theoretical frameworks are abstract
contrivances, and that these have validity
only within the knowledge framework
favoured by elite groups. They assert that
theory in science is intimately linked with
particular conceptual frameworks, and that
many of these are as contentious today as
they were one hundred years ago. Further,
scientific theory cannot be unalterably true,
since it is constantly changing and
adapting to current scientific discoveries.
Constructivists deny the possibility of
immutable reality in the theoretical entities
of modern science. They use historical
analysis to justify their conclusions about
the weak relationships between empirical
discoveries, conceptual frameworks and
theory in traditional science (Kuhn, 1970).
Those who support the constructivist
agenda in education typically eschew the
traditional
scientific
methods
of
quantitative science. Instead they advocate
qualitative research and case study
methods and stress the importance of
analysis rather than discovery. They
maintain that there is an essential
Vol. 22 No. 1, 1997
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arbitrariness in much of scientific and
educational research and theory. They
emphasise context in the interpretation of
social phenomena and personal experience
is given a great deal of prominence.
Constructivists are particularly critical of
scientism: the view that only in traditional
science and its applications can one obtain
the answers to many of the problems that
pervade our everyday affairs.
THE SCIENTIFIC REALISTS VIEW
ON THEORY AND THE NATURE OF
SCIENCE
Scientific realists maintain that science is a
body of knowledge that reflects real world
phenomena and that valid theory is
independent of the phenomena it describes.
The generalisations of scientific theory are
said to explain the brute facts of the world.
They maintain that traditional science
supports the scientific method as the basic
mechanism for. the development of
reliable knowledge. Searle (1995) has
recently made a strong plea in defence the
realist's position that the propositions used
to describe the world are different from the
substance and features of the world. He
adopts the view that questions about the
nature of reality should be distinguished
from questions about how one acquires
knowledge of that reality. The first is an
ontological question; the second an
epistemological question.
From the scientific realist's perspective,
historical analysis reveals clear progress in
the demonstration of improved theoretical
representations of physical and social
phenomena (Boyd, 1983). Consistent with
this view, each scientific discovery is said
to lead to a closer approximation of reality.
Hypotheses derived from theory are used
to direct the scientific agenda, but such
constructs do not determine the outcome of
scientific endeavour. Scientific theories are
interpretations of phenomena that predict
and explain phenomena.
The justification for the scientific method
rests on the processes of abduction. By this
it is meant that the key statements of
science offer the best possible explanation
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of observed relationships. There is no
obvious discontinuity in the different kinds
of scientific explanation that emerge with
each stage of scientific discovery. Progress
in science is largely incremental, with
more substantive representations of reality
being revealed with each set of significant
discoveries. Those who support scientific
realism contend that the scientific method
is the best logically defensible procedure
with which to examine the world and the
complex relationships that emerge among
phenomena. The scientific method is also
the basis for resolving questions about the
value of competing theoretical structures.
Contentious issues involving different
paradigms or theories are decided by
objective analysis of evidence. The
purpose of the scientific method is to free
the investigator from the biases that may
abound because of prejudice, false doctrine
or incorrect theory. The discipline of the
scientific method allows the research
worker to differentiate those questions or
problems that are of a purely empirical
kind from those that are value-laden or
those
requiring
further
conceptual
clarification. Most realists maintain there is
an essential dichotomy between statements
of interpretation and statements that
purport to inform us about the nature of the
world.
Educators who support the scientific realist
position adopt experimental and empirical
viewpoints. They are typically strongly
quantitative in orientation. Paradoxically,
they are often sceptical of the results of a
typical scientific investigation and
constantly test the outcomes of such
investigations and the accompanying
theories and the predictions made in the
name of science. They maintain that
constructivism is essentially a sceptical
philosophy that fails to recognise the high
levels of prediction that follow the
discovery
of
important
scientific
relationships. We now turn to the two
issues that most divide the scientific
realists and the constructivists. 1 refer to
the matter of observation statements and
relativism.
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OBSERVATION STATEMENTS
Beliefs about the nature of reality can be
derived from direct contact with relevant
objects, reports of observations, or
representations of reality in the form of
social facts. The first of these are called
primary observations (Fodor, 1984). The
reports of such observation statements are
claimed to be the basis of much reputable
science. Observation statements are said to
be the foundation of knowledge and the
scientific method allows summary
statements of these observations. These, in
turn, are used as the basis of theories and
interpretations of phenomena. Searle's
(1995) notion of brute facts can be
included under this heading. The second
kind of belief is based on knowledge that
can be derived from sources other than
direct observation. For example, scientists
typically use the reports of other scientists
to bolster their claims about certain
phenomena and relationships among extant
data. They argue that their judgements
depend on the validity of observation
statements made by others. Such secondary
sources are typically perceived to be less
reliable than direct observations (Fodor,
1984).
The third category includes social facts or
institutional facts and these are dependent
on a different level of representation of
reality. Searle (1995) has suggested that
such social facts are very different from
the brute facts and secondary observations
described above. For example, the
proposition that Mt Kosciusko is the
highest peak in the country is a social fact
dependent
on
the
government
instrumentality that gave the peak its
particular name. The brute fact is that the
mountain
exists;
the
secondary
observations are included in maps or
descriptions drawn by cartographers.
Scientists usually stress that they claim
knowledge of the brute facts of the world,
but use others' reports and conventional
social and scientific categories to classify
and describe relationships among features
of objects and events.
44

The constructivist is usually sceptical of
most of the claims made by realists about
the objectivity of methods used to secure
primary and secondary observations. They
claim that much data gathering of the kind
described above is dependent on
preconceived views of the world. They
claim that a typical scientist's theory
determines the type of phenomena to be
observed and that nearly all science is
dependent on social facts, not brute facts.
In particular, there is criticism of the
extension or generalisation of particular
scientific findings to other contexts or
dimensions of experience (Fodor, 1984).
The constructivist is critical of the realist's
claim that the events observed by scientists
are invariably reliable in different contexts.
They also question whether there can be
any extension of knowledge beyond the
narrow confines of the particular instances
of observation.
The constructivist denies that the scientist
can offer a guarantee that direct
observations will lead to reliable theories
about the nature of phenomena. The
possibility of other theories leading to
similar predictions must always be
considered (Feyerabend, 1975). They also
maintain that the conceptual frameworks
used in scientific observation invariably
change with each new investigation. The
training of the scientist is also seen to be
crucial in determining choices about
methodology, research hypotheses and
analysis of data (Kuhn, 1981). It is posited
that the scientific community dictates
standards in all fields of investigative
endeavour and determines how data are
observed and how problems are solved in
these fields.
Not surprisingly, the scientific realist
challenges these claims. The realist replies
that scientists are. constantly on guard
against biased observations and inadequate
theories. All observations are subject to
checks done by others using alternate
equipment, in other settings, and with other
experimental subjects. Likewise, theory is
subject to constant challenge and
double-blind experimental procedures are
Vol. 22 No. 1, 1997
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commonplace. Any observations that
contain experimenter biases are rejected. If
any of these observations lead to a conflict
in the interpretation, then the conclusions
drawn from those observations are
rejected. Scientific realists recognise the
tenuous links between observation and
theory, but claim that the scientific method
ensures that observations and their
conceptual underpinnings are rigorously
tested against valid criteria. They also
claim that the theories they support must
always have better predictive or
explanatory power than any alternatives.
Many realists have made their reputations
by disputing facts and challenging the
methods and techniques used to support
established theories. This is Popper's
(1975) agenda for the reputable scientist.
Popper advocates a version of realism and
asserts that all theoretical structures should
be tested against alternative interpretations.
He has proclaimed the tentative and
hypothetical nature of all scientific
theories. Scientific realists reject the view
that they have secure purchase over
theoretical constructs, even those with
supposed impeccable credentials.
Proponents of the opposed doctrines of
realism and constructivism continue to
debate these key issues. There is no
resolution because each denies the
premises of the other. Constructivists and
realists are capable of pointing to the
influence of external factors on the
evolution of scientific thought. Both use
historical analysis to confirm the
prejudicial influence of elite scientific
communities on scientific thought.
RELATIVISM
Advocates of constructivism deny that
theoretical statements can be defined in
terms of universally agreed criteria.
According to their view, the validity of any
set of statements can only be determined
by reference to a particular context or
observation. In a typical case, a context is
defined in terms of relevance to a
particular set of problems in a unique
environment. Further, the measure of
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validity of any set of theoretical statements
derived from such experience is
determined by those confined to the same
environment.
Constructivists often question the logical
status of the propositions in the realist's
agenda. They challenge both the inductive
and hypotheticodeductive arguments of
modern science. The logical problems of
induction were identified by Hume (1739)
and his insights are as valid today as they
were several centuries ago. Hume argued
that it is futile to trust the proposition that
the future will be like the past, the essential
basis of inductive argument. In essence,
the argument is that it is logically false to
base any theory about future events on the
supposed validity of past events. The
hypothetico-deductive argument is placed
in the same category. In such cases the
propositions of science demand a
conceptual framework determined before
data are gathered and analysed. Either way,
according to the constructivists, the
scientific bases of the scientific realist lack
a logical basis.
The constructivist agenda is based on key
tenets of relativism. Kuhn (1970) has said
that "there is no standard higher than the
assent of the relevant community" (p. 94).
The relativist in this context argues that
validity of any scientific proposition is
determined by the judgements of
colleagues in the same field. Kuhn's
analysis of historical evidence has led him
to support the view that there is constant
adjustment of scientific viewpoints
depending upon the cogency of prevailing
views in established social and intellectual
elites. Established paradigms in such
circles determine the search for reality and
these are also used to judge the validity of
any conclusions drawn from research.
The realists are opposed to the relativist
agenda. Realists assert the status of reality
is in ontological truth (Searle, 1995). They
claim that the world is independent of
particular
theoretical
claims
or
philosophical interpretations. The principle
of meaningful assertion is important in this
regard. This holds that there is a class of
45
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statements made about the world that can
be confirmed or denied by empirical
research. This is coupled with the principle
of objective evidence. It asserts that any
proposition should be capable of an
independent validity check performed by
other reputable scientists. It asserts that the
ultimate truth of most theoretical
propositions can never be completely
verified, but that it is possible to falsify
such claims by means of observation. Such
fundamental tenets are claimed to counter
to the themes of relativism espoused by the
constructivists (Boyd, 1983).

facts correspond to the scientific
hypotheses, or if the facts support or
confirm the hypotheses then the
conclusions are said to be valid.
Independent observations are said to
confirm or deny the truth of propositions
of a scientific kind. Disagreements
regarding particular beliefs are settled by
reference to observational statements. If
the observational statements do not support
one kind of belief then that particular
proposition is rejected. If not, then the
proposition is tentatively accepted as a best
possible explanation.

Realists dispute the essential tenets of
relativism. Well known philosophical
arguments are used to attempt to defeat its
logic. Plato in the Theaetetus, was one of
the first to denounce the relativist
argument. Plato claimed that, using the
competence of an individual as an
example, that expertise depends upon
knowledge and that to have competence is
to have demonstrated knowledge. Plato
then asked: can we agree that the
competent individual differs from the
incompetent? In responding to this
question, the relativists are often
confounded. If they argue that the
competent individual exists then they must
define the characteristics that differentiate
the competent individual from others. If
they argue that such characteristics do not
exist, they are obliged to support the view
that the incompetent individual has the
same status as the competent. Likewise,
the question can be asked whether a theory
in science can be defined in terms of its
characteristics of worth and good science
differentiated
from
poor
science.
According to the realist, the constructivist
invariably asserts a sceptical position,
which is essentially unacceptable in the
context of modern scientific opinion.

THE
IMPLICATIONS
EDUCATION

The realist argues that science demands a
measure of correspondence between the
status of scientific propositions and
phenomena in the real world. The realist
need not support a correspondence theory
of truth, rather a belief in the concordance
of science and reality (Searle, 1995). If the
46
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Theory construction is the critical issue in
the debate between the supporters of
constructivism and scientific realism in
education.
Traditional
science
has
favoured the views of scientific realism.
This doctrine was backed by educators in
the past because of its links with traditional
empirical
science.
Education
was
categorised as a social science and
included in the disciplines that utilised the
scientific method. Science was respected
because of its apparent rigour, its seeming
validity, and its capacity to inform
educators about the effectiveness of
particular methods in the classroom.
However, in recent decades the status of
traditional science in education has been
questioned, in large part because research
on schooling has been said to offer few
findings
of
great
utility
and
generalisability. The present opposition to
scientific realism reflects a disenchantment
with the links between the methods
recommended by empirical science and the
teaching procedures used in schools.
More recently, theory building in
education has drawn the attention of
researchers from outside the traditional
scientific mould. No longer is it the sole
province of the scientific realist. This is
partly because the central problems of
education have shifted from generalised
empirical findings to concerns about the
individual teacher's experience of students
in classrooms. Examination of the
Vol. 22 No. 1, 1997

Australian Journal of Teacher Education

Vol. 22 No. 1, 1997

47

Australian Journal of Teacher Education

viewpoint of the individual teacher has
become paramount in examination of
teaching practice. Idiographic research has
come to dominate much of the research
agenda in education. Educators are
encouraged to explore their own
experiences and those of their colleagues
and students when offering explanations of
classroom activity. Experience with the
particular problems of the classroom is
claimed as instructive to other teachers in
similar contexts. The case study is viewed
as the major vehicle of research
methodology. Theory building is integral
to an individual teacher's actions and not a
task requiring knowledge of experimental
methodology.
Relativism is inherent to all theory
building according to those in the
constructivist camp in education. Particular
contexts are said to determine all spheres
of action in teaching and learning.
Wholesale generalisations of
such
experience are inappropriate because of the
differences in each individual teacher's
experience.
Constructivists
value
qualitative and descriptive methods. The
perceptions of the teacher dominate
theoretical
investigations
and
the
individual's interpretations determine the
study of educational experience. The
personal perspectives that each individual
brings to the classroom is seen to be
critical to the analysis of the meaning of
classroom events.
Realists in the research field of education
teaching object to many of the
constructivist's views (Schrag, 1992). They
continue to espouse the value of the
scientific model for the analysis of key
research questions. The realists in
education remain committed to scientific
research of the traditional kind. They claim
that there are empirical questions that
require value-free analysis and that the
methods of science allow the best form of
investigation at this level. The importance
of the nomothetic methods that focus on
general laws and proven principles remains
dominant in universities and schools that
favour the realist agenda.
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Many realists claim that an individual's
experience of the world is not science and
that excessive emphasis on case study
methods leads only to an expansion of
knowledge of individual activity. They
claim that science does not promote
analysis of individual values but should
encourage the growth of knowledge
general utility that can be useful to
teachers. They are critical of the
subjectivity and relativism of the
constructivist agenda. They eschew the
individualistic
findings
of
the
constructivists and press for greater
objectivity in theory building and research
endeavour.
One doctrine is committed to idiographic
research; the other has an obligation to a
nomothetic agenda. The constructivist is
persuaded of the value of individual
experience and the implications of this
kind of research to individual problem
solving. The realist perceives more
objectivity in the scientific method and the
links with traditional science. The debate
continues to engender strong responses
from both sides of the divide.
Academics in the field of teacher education
have long been concerned with this
problem. How do we justify our
recommendations about how to teach and
what strategies and methods should be
employed in classrooms? Do we base our
decisions on the case study methodologies
and stress individual experience? Or do we
adopt a different stance and look to the
general
principles
derived
from
experimental methodologies? Most of us
adopt the compromise position and use
arguments from both sources to justify our
advice to novice teachers. This is probably
a good approach. Even so, we need to
remind ourselves that there are different
kinds of arguments needed to support these
two categories of recommendation.
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